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Symbolic and Concrete Demands in Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Abstract
Researchers have recently leveled criticism at the realist approach to conflict resolution by pointing out
the importance of symbolic aspects of this issue. Few studies, however, have hitherto focused on
symbolic demands in conflicts. The present study examines the role of symbolic as well as concrete
demands in conflict resolution, and is therefore innovative in this regard. A demand is categorized as
“concrete” if it is based on an interest that is viable and applicable, in that it involves tangible resources
that may change hands or be divided. A “symbolic” demand, on the other hand, pivots on either refraining
from or taking action rather than on a tangible result. With reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this
research suggests that the relationship between symbolic and concrete demands can serve as a tool for
achieving conflict resolution – not only by compensating for symbolic demands with concrete demands
and vice versa but also by balancing between the symbolic and the concrete aspects within the same
demand. These findings may have valuable implications for the use of symbolic discourse as an
instrument to transform conflicts.
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Peace and Conflict Studies
Symbolic and Concrete Demands in Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Rotem Nagar and Jacob Shamir
Abstract
Researchers have recently leveled criticism at the realist approach to conflict resolution by
pointing out the importance of symbolic aspects of this issue. Few studies, however, have hitherto
focused on symbolic demands in conflicts. The present study examines the role of symbolic as
well as concrete demands in conflict resolution, and is therefore innovative in this regard. A
demand is categorized as “concrete” if it is based on an interest that is viable and applicable,
in that it involves tangible resources that may change hands or be divided. A “symbolic”
demand, on the other hand, pivots on either refraining from or tak ing action rather than on a
tangible result. With reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this research suggests that the
relationship between symbolic and concrete demands can serve as a tool for achieving
conflict resolution – not only by compensating for symbolic demands with concrete demands
and vice versa but also by balancing between the symbolic and the concrete aspects within the
same demand. These findings may have valuable implications for the use of symbolic discourse
as an instrument to transform conflicts.
Introduction
According to the classical realist approach to conflict resolution, the parties’ actions
are motivated by the desire to advance their interests and maximize their gains, and therefore
symbolic aspects of the issue are deemed irrelevant. During the last two decades, however,
realist researchers have conceded that, within the boundaries of the realist research of
negotiations, symbolic aspects should not be dismissed altogether – albeit recognizing them
only as part of a game whose object is to maximize gains (Zartman, 1983). This approach
has, in turn, incurred criticism, on the grounds that conflicts can be better understood through
the prism of symbolism rather than realism (Faure, 1999; Kaufman & Bisharat, 2002). Thus,
in investigations of conflict resolution, the importance of symbolic issues in conflicts has
recently come to the forefront.
To the extent that symbols are at the heart of conflicts, matters of honor and guilt may
be more important than even the central resource of the village life – the land (Nader & Todd,
1978). Issues that accumulate throughout a conflict have symbolic value that may "defy
simple, rational understanding" (Faure, 1999, p. 20) and pertain to human suffering and
honor, rather than to land and houses that have been lost forever (Kaufman & Bisharat,
2002).
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Conflicts are based on key rights and/or demands that arise from basic identity
metaphors and narratives (Zartman, 1983; Ross, 2001). Accordingly, human rights have
become an integral part of conflict resolution (Gaer, 1997; Kaufman & Bisharat, 2002).
Conflicts have also come to involve sacred values (such as justice), which are perceived as
absolute and uncompromisable (Atran et al., 2007; Atran & Axelrod, 2008; Wade-Benzoni et
al., 2002). It is not surprising, therefore, that barriers in fundamental political conflicts often
include differences in the sacred values and narratives of the sides (Susskind et al., 2005;
Bazerman et al., 2008). Conversely, a symbolic gesture recognizing the values of the “other”
may facilitate the negotiation and even resolution of a charged conflict. Moreover, symbolic
meanings may have a powerful effect on the actions of the negotiating parties (Faure, 1999).
Indeed, in international politics, nations’ behavior is not based solely on considerations of
power and sheer interests, but often involves aspirations for justice as well (Welch, 1993).
In conflicts accompanied by turbulent emotions and disagreements over prestige, the
solution to the crisis may lie in a symbolic remedy (Cohen, 1997). However, to secure just
and legitimate peace, the symbolic sacrifice may not be enough: more matters must be
settled, including recognition of the “other” as an entity with an identity, history and culture
(the so-called “thin recognition”) and understanding the basic characteristics of the “other”
(“wide recognition”) (Allan & Keller, 2006). Recognizing the rights of the “other,” even on
the declarative level, may provide the basis for a constructive negotiation and demonstrate a
symbolic willingness to settle the conflict (Kaufman & Bisharat, 2002). Yet, in spite of the
findings that point to the importance of symbolic aspects in conflict resolution, few
researchers have examined the effect of symbolic demands on international political
processes. The present study seeks to fill this void by developing an approach in conflict
research that acknowledges the limitations of the realist models and examines the role of
symbolic demands, as well as their relation to concrete demands, in conflict resolution
processes. In addition to offering a new theoretical perspective on this issue, we focus on the
practical implications of the analysis of conflict resolution processes, and especially the use
of symbolic discourse as an instrument to transform conflicts.
Concrete and Symbolic Demands
The concepts of concrete and symbolic demands are based on Fra ser's (1995)
theoretical work. Fraser described a conceptual continuum between two types of demands
for social justice: recognition and redistribution. Demands for distributive justice stem from
socio-economic injustice linked to the economic structure. Demands for identity recognition
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arise out of cultural injustice rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation and
communication. Unlike the paradigm of redistribution, cultural injustice aligns better with
Webber’s status groups than with Marx’s classes. While, according to the redistribution
paradigm, the solution is a new economic structure, the remedy suggested by the recognition
paradigm is a symbolic change (Fraser & Honneth, 2003).
Fraser’s model has sparked disagreement among scholars. Young (1997) contends
that it represents a false dichotomy, and that redistribution and recognition are not mutually
exclusive, but rather both stem from a demand for justice. Honneth (2001) censures Fraser’s
work, imputing to it Marxist economic reductionism, and arguing that redistribution is
essential for justice but should be subsumed under the category of recognition. Economic
injustice, on Honneth’s view, is experienced as injustice stemming from disrespect, for
example the violation of a complex order of recognition in society.
While conceding that recognition and redistribution are not “clear-cut” categories, we
will argue – contrary to Honneth’s (2001) approach – that the distinction between them is
meaningful, and that therefore this dualism deserves a place in the study of political demands
in negotiation. In line with Fraser (1995, 1998), we will attempt to demonstrate that an
analytic distinction can be drawn between demands that are primarily symbolic, such as
recognition, justice and apology, on the one hand, and demands that are inherently concrete,
such as distribution of territory, water etc., on the other. Our working hypothesis to this
effect is that demands set forth in negotiations can be located on a bi-polar continuum
ranging from “symbolic” to “concrete.” The mapping of the various demands, and the
analysis of the relations between them, should be performed bearing in mind the uncertainties
involved in delimiting the two categories and the possibility that any specific demand may be
linked to both ends of the spectrum.
We categorize a demand as concrete if it is based on an interest that is viable and
applicable, in that it includes tangible resources that may change hands or be divided. For a
demand to be symbolic, its meaning must lie in the action of making it and not in a tangible
result. While any specific demand might carry both a symbolic and a concrete connotation,
we classify it as either symbolic or concrete depending on the phrasing. Thus “water” is
arguably an emotionally charged term, but at the same time it is an important physical
resource. Consequently, a specific suggestion regarding the use of water is considered a
concrete demand. Similarly, while recognition is usually perceived as a purely symbolic act, a
demand to accept the end of demands is, in itself, a legal political demand which has the
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concrete significance of assuring the other side that no additional demands, concrete or
symbolic, can be made. In this case, even though no material property has changed hands,
the right to make demands has been forfeited, and this has strong concrete implications.
Methodology
In this study, the role of symbolic and concrete demands in conflict resolution is
examined in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The situation investigated is rife
with political symbolism due to the sides’ strong emotional attitudes regarding questions of
land, nation, security and survival. It has been argued that the failure of Israeli and
Palestinian leaders to reach a solution is attributable to symbolic factors (Hermann &
Newman, 2000).
Negotiations to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict epitomize a contrast between
symbolic discourse regarding recognition and justice, on the one hand, and concrete discourse
regarding resources in a framework of costs and benefits, on the other. Most researchers
concur that the Palestinian side tends to perceive the conflict in terms of rights and frame its
demands in terms of justice, focusing on key values (Albin, 2001; Allan & Keller, 2006;
Peled & Rouhana, 2007). By contrast, the Israeli side purportedly frames the negotiation in
terms of rational cost-benefit analysis centered on considerations of security and territory
(Albin, 2001; Shamir & Shikaki, 2010; Sabet, 1998). It goes without saying that this
difference in perception is reflected in the public and the political arenas; it determines the
framing of the conflict management in public discourse and influences the assessment of
possibilities for various solutions.
In this study, the symbolic and concrete aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
were examined using two methodological tools: (1) interviews with politicians and experts on
both sides who had been involved in the peace process over the years, and (2) surveys to
gauge the Israeli and Palestinian public opinion.
Politicians and Experts Involved In the Peace Process
Our choice of the sample was motivated by two considerations. First, the politicians
and public figures we interviewed were familiar with the entire negotiation process and with
the demands set forth by both parties over the years. Moreover, these were the key figures in
the peace process: the ones who had led the negotiations and suggested wordings to resolve
the disputed issues.
The respondents’ preferences for concrete versus symbolic demands were assessed
based on semi-structured in-depth interviews. The attitudes of the Israeli and the Palestinian
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experts were examined with regard to each of the demands that had been subject to
negotiation over the years: the right of return; recognizing the pain and suffering of the
refugees; recognizing Israel’s part in creating the refugee problem; water rights; territory;
security; end of the conflict; end of demands; mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as
the national homes of their respective peoples; recognition of the State of Israel as a state of
the Jewish people. For each demand, we determine whether the interviewers treated it as
symbolic or concrete, according to the analytic distinction elaborated above.
The interviews with the Israeli experts were conducted in Hebrew and took place in
Israel. The Palestinian experts were interviewed in Arabic, mostly in the West Bank, by a
Palestinian Israeli and the interviews were subsequently translated into Hebrew.
All in all, eleven interviews were conducted with Israeli Jewish experts and politicians.
All Israeli interviewees studied in depth the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and had participated in
formal and informal negotiations, as negotiators or as political consulates, among them the
Oslo negotiations, the Taba Summit and the Camp David summit in 2000 and so on.
Moreover, three of the Israeli interviewees participated in drafting the Geneva Accord, the
only final status peace accord drafted jointly by Israelis and Palestinians .
Five interviews were conducted with Palestinian experts and politicians All
Palestinian interviewees are senior public leaders, most of them in senior positions in the
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and/or the Palestinian National Authority. Most of
the Palestinian interviewees had participated in formal and informal negotiations, among
them the Oslo negotiations, the Wye River discussions, the Taba Summit and the Camp
David summit in 2000. Some of them participated in drafting the Geneva Accord. All
interviewees were assured that they will not be quoted directly, and to protect their identities,
throughout the paper they will be referred to by random letters of the alphabet.
Public Opinion among Israelis and Palestinians
As stated before, in addition to the interviews, we conducted opinion polls among the
Palestinian and Israeli publics. The decision to study public opinion was prompted by the
important role it plays in the two- level negotiation game (Putnam, 1988; Shamir & Shikaki,
2010) and in foreign policy decisions (Holsti, 1992). Indeed, it is public opinion that
underlies collective wisdom and lends legitimacy to leaders and policies alike (Shamir &
Shamir, 2000). Moreover, given the reciprocal relation between state leadership and public
opinion (Shamir, 2005), an analysis of each cannot be complete without the understanding of
the other. Public opinion is known to be sensitive to symbolic gestures and lend support to a
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negotiator who comes up with an appropriate wording to frame a demand – this may be
especially the case in conflicts over symbolic values (Shamir & Shikaki, 2010). It is
therefore necessary to examine the views of both publics investigated, on both symbolic and
material issues, particularly in light of their sensitivity to the symbolic aspects of this specific
debate.
The data are based on the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll (JIPP), which has
simultaneously tracked Israeli and Palestinian public opinion since 2000. The polls were
planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute
for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the
Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy
and Survey Research (PSR). In addition to using data from the polls conducted since the year
of 2000, we developed several questions regarding demands related to redistribution and
recognition and included them in the December 2008 and March 2010 polls (Israeli poll:
N=600; Palestinian poll: N=1270). In all the surveys the Palestinian data are based on faceto-face interviews conducted among representative samples in Gaza, the West Bank and East
Jerusalem. The Israeli data comprise of interviews with representative samples of adult
Israelis conducted over the phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian. The Israeli sample is
weighted based on the proportion of Arab and Jewish citizens in the general population, as
well as on the results of the general elections preceding the poll.
Respondents were presented with pairs of issues, one symbolic and the other concrete,
and asked which among the two they deemed the more important. In all the pairs, symbolic
gains were centered around recognition, due to the importance of this issue in the day-to-day
political discourse, while concrete issues focused on territorial compromises. Israeli
respondents were asked to choose between Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the
Jewish people versus sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. In addition,
they were asked to choose between Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state versus
sovereignty over settlement blocs in Judea and Samaria. Palestinian respondents were asked
to choose between Israeli recognition of the right of return, accompanied by the return of
refugees to Palestine (but not to Israel), versus a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders. In
addition, they were asked to choose between Israeli recognition of the right of return,
accompanied by the return of refugees to Palestine (but not to Israel) versus Palestinian
sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.
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In addition, each participant was asked to rank two symbolic and two concrete
demands in terms of their importance. The demands that were presented to the Israeli sample
and those that were presented to the Palestinian sample had nearly identical social and
cultural significance for the sides. The following demands were presented randomly to the
Israeli sample: Creating early warning facilities within the Palestinian state to prevent a
surprise attack; Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people; securing
Israel’s water rights; Palestinian recognition of Israeli pain and suffering throughout the
conflict (2008), or alternatively, Palestinian declaration of the “end of the conflict” (2010).
The demands that were randomly presented to the Palestinian sample were as follows: safe
passage between the West Bank and Gaza; Israeli recognition of Palestine as the home of the
Palestinian people; securing Palestinian water rights in any future agreement; Israeli
recognition of the pain and suffering caused to the Palestinians throughout the conflict. In
order to compare the issues in terms of their importance to the respondents, each of the issues
presented to both the Israeli and the Palestinian participants was assigned an index of
importance based on the following formula:
Index of Importance (only for the questions that involved ranking in terms of
importance):
(1)
(Frequency as first priority)*4 + (frequency of as second priority)*3 +
(frequency as third priority)*2 + (frequency as last priority)*1.
Findings: Examining the Symbolic-Concrete Continuum for Each Side
Experts’ Assessment of Each Negotiated Demand as Symbolic and/or Concrete
The right of return.
Most Israeli interviewees distinguished between a declarative symbolic recognition of
the right of return and its concrete implementation. The prevailing feeling among the Israeli
participants was that, throughout peace negotiations, Palestinians have emp hasized the
symbolic demand in this regard but have been willing to compromise on its concrete
implementation. Israeli interviewee A, for example, stated that “the declaration is more
important to them... than the actual implementation. It is important to their leadership... [it is]
important to their people, it’s important to the refugees. ” The interviewees based their
opinions on both formal and informal negotiations. Thus, Israeli interviewee E mentioned
the Geneva Accord, in which, as he put it, the P alestinians “gave up the right of return in
exchange for a symbolic right of return.” Israeli interviewee F brought up the negotiations
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with Yasser Arafat, contending that Arafat's historic “trade-off,” as he called it, “was to
exchange Palestinian sovereignty over Temple Mount for the right to return,” a concession
that is both material and symbolic. In the same light the Israeli interviewees saw the Arab
Initiative for Peace. Thus, participant F believed that the Arab League's March 2009 decision
clearly indicates that the Palestinian side is willing to forgo any actual return of refugees.
The Palestinian interviewees emphasized that recognition is essential but not
sufficient, and that concrete implementation is needed. They noted, however, that they are
well aware that the extent of the right of return must be regulated based on an agreement with
Israel, or in other words, that not all refugees would return to the State of Israel. Their
responses distinguished between the recognition of each refugee's right to return and a limited
implementation of this right. Palestinian interviewee N asserted that the Palestinians
“understand that, at the end of the process [peace negotiations], not all refugees can or would
want to return.” He went on to say that, while “for Palestinians, recognition of the right of
return is very important... they know that there is a difference between having a right and
realizing it.” Palestinian interviewee M stated that “Israel must recognize this right in
principle... We need to… separate between… the issue of recognizing the right and the
responsibility for the great crime… and the issue of implementation.”
Recognizing the pain and suffering of the refugees and recognizing Is rael’s part
in creating the refugee problem.
Most Israeli interviewees saw recognition of the pain and suffering of the Palestinian
refugees as an important part of the negotiation, which may serve as a compensation for more
concrete concessions. However, no consensus emerged regarding Israel’s obligation to
accept responsibility for creating the refugee problem. Indeed, some of the respondents
expressed the belief that the pain and suffering of the Palestinian people ought to be
recognized, albeit without taking blame for it. Israeli interviewee I felt that hundreds of
Palestinians “want the feeling that Israel says that it admits… responsibility for what
happened with the refugees.” However, in the Geneva Accord “we did go that far
recognizing the suffering caused to the Palestinian people [without taking responsibility].” In
his opinion, recognition of the Palestinian suffering is important, and if the Palestinian
representatives in the Geneva negotiation had been satisfied in this regard, this would have
had “a good effect on the Palestinian public opinion.” Israeli interviewee J, who suggested
that Israel should recognize the pain and suffering, saw the Palestinian demand that
recognition of pain and suffering should be combined with acceptance of responsibility as
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“an impossible combination” – and as he put it, “a zero-sum game.” On the other hand,
Israeli interviewee C believed that accepting responsibility is important for the negotiation.
He stated that the third and fourth generations of refugees:
“…want two things... one is related to the concrete dimension and the other to
the symbolic dimension. Regarding the concrete dimension, they want a
solution… in terms of compensation and rehabilitation in exchange for their
terrible loss... Regarding the symbolic dimension... it’s [for Israel] to stand up
and apologize.”
The Palestinian side also attached great importance to recognizing the pain and
suffering of refugees, but pointed out that Israel must accept responsibility for the emergence
of the refugee problem. Moreover, they emphasized that this recognition must be
accompanied by concrete actions. Palestinian interviewee M stated that the solution to the
refugee problem requires “first and foremost” Israeli recognition of the Nakba and of Israel's
responsibility for it, and underscored the practical implications of such responsibility: “I
don’t care about the apology if it is not accompanied by a practical procedure...” Palestinian
interviewee A held a similar position, stating: “Recognizing the pain and suffering is
important but it's not everything. To achieve peace, we want to see… things happening in the
Palestinian people's reality.”
Wate r rights.
All but one of the Israeli interviewees expressed a pragmatic view of this issue,
seeking alternative technical solutions to dividing the Mountain Aquifer, such as desalination.
Palestinian interviewees likewise focused on the concrete aspect of the situa tion, namely, the
need for an equal share of the water. Unlike the Israelis, however, Palestinian interviewees
offered fewer specific solutions to the problem. Palestinian Interviewee N stated that, to the
best of his knowledge as a member of the committee that negotiated water rights, “there is
nothing symbolic, it’s a practical thing.” Palestinian Interviewee O was one of two
respondents who spoke in terms of justice: “We want a fair and just solution to the division of
resources and water.” Palestinian Interviewee M highlighted the Palestinians rights under
international law, but also called for an equitable division of the water.
Territory (including the Jerusalem question).
It has been widely acknowledged that any debate over territory includes both
symbolic and concrete aspects, and this is especially so when the point of contention is
Jerusalem and its sacred sites. Nevertheless, both the Israeli and the Palestinian interviewees
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revealed for the most part a pragmatic attitude in this matter, and their approach to the issue
pivoted on practical solutions for the division of territories. Indeed, most saw Jerusalem as a
divisible resource – in fact, in their view, it was already divided, for all intents and purposes.
Israeli interviewees E, C, and J offered solutions involving an exchange of territory.
Interviewee J even quantified the problem, asserting that a “serious” disagreement was
confined to 5% of the West Bank, while the debate over the rest of the territory had been
resolved by prior negotiations. Israeli Interviewee A suggested that a concession in terms of
territorial exchange can help achieve compromises on the right of return. Israeli interviewee
B supported a pragmatic approach to territorial issues, criticizing the shift in the attitude of
the Israeli public from pragmatic to symbolic, expressed in the discourse focusing on
“historical rights to the land of Israel.” He rejected the “united Jerusalem” approach, stating
that the issue is not pragmatic (“no one looks at the map”) and that “the unity of Jerusalem”
has become “a slogan.”
The Palestinian interviewees’ discussion of territory likewise centered on practical
solutions. Palestinian interviewees L, N, P and O spoke of recognizing the 1967 borders and
allocating land based on territorial exchange. L stated that territory is a pragmatic rather than
a symbolic issue: “From a pragmatic perspective, I know that to get Hebron I need to give up
Haifa. I can’t get both Haifa and Hebron. I expect the same of the Israeli side.”
Security.
As is the case with territory, it has been widely acknowledged that security is an issue
that incorporates symbolic as well as concrete aspects. Here, too, the interviews revealed a
pragmatic approach on the part of the Israeli respondents, most of whom addressed the issue
by offering practical solutions. Israeli interviewee I, for example, explained why any
solution in this regard must involve demilitarization in exchange for “strategic depth”
(strategic presence of Israeli forces outside of the Green Line). Israeli interviewee H
described the security problem as a complex set of “technical issues” that are already being
solved on a daily basis. As in the discussions of territory, a number of Israeli interviewees
criticized what they saw as symbolic intransigence on security issues among Israeli public.
Israeli interviewee G, for example, criticized the insistence of the Israeli side on reserving the
right to fly over the West Bank, and contended that it was a symbolic demand with no
substance to it: “What's the area of the West Bank for an F15 or F16?... It’s a joke. ”
On the Palestinian side, interviewees N, M and L offered specific suggestions in
connection with security issues. Thus, interviewee N spoke about an international presence
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in the Jordan Rift Valley, and the possibility of using radar and satellite dishes in the West
Bank. Similarly, interviewee M suggested that an international force be present, “for the short
or long term as determined by both sides.” Interviewee L chose to discuss a security model
proposed as part of the Geneva Accord. Palestinian interviewees M and P, on the other hand,
saw security as a tool used by Israel to seize land.
End of the conflict and end of demands.
“End of the conflict” is a political demand that the accord mark the formal end of the
conflict. “End of demands” is a political- legal demand that both parties' demands be set down
in the accord, such that, once the accord has been signed, parties can only claim its
implementation.
While some of the Israeli interviewees saw both these demands as concrete and
essential, others saw the end of demands as a concrete claim, while the end of the conflict as
symbolic. From the responses of Israeli interviewees, it was clear that those who viewed end
of the conflict as a concrete demand believed it to be important. Interviewees who saw this
demand as symbolic, on the other hand, were divided as to its importance for the peace
process. Thus, for Israeli interviewee K, both demands were essential:
If you leave things open, then we haven’t ended the conflict… It’s very
important for Israel that the peace agreement should stipulate the end of the
conflict… Regarding demands, that’s a legal issue. This means all the
demands… have been settled.
In contrast, in the opinion of Israeli interviewee B, the end of demands is a legal
contract, while the end of the conflict symbolizes the shift from a pragmatic public discussion
to a symbolic public discussion, the latter characteristic of Israeli public opinion in recent
years. Similarly, Interviewee C regarded the end of the conflict as “something that we… I
don’t want to say we made it up, but maybe we did. ” In his view, the end of the conflict
demand has no concrete significance; yet, in the Geneva Accord, he had pushed for its
inclusion on account of its symbolic value, which – he believed – could serve as “a tool that
would help sell the agreement to the Israeli public. ”
On the Palestinian side, all the interviewees attached importance to both demands in
equal measure. Unlike the Israelis, the Palestinians saw both the end of the conflict and the
end of demands claim as endowed with concrete significance. For example, Palestinian
interviewee N stated that both demands were important “from the perspective that both sides
can be sure that they have solved all the problems.” Similarly, Palestinian interviewee P
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believed both these demands to be important and pointed to the section of the Arab Peace
Initiative referring to them.
Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the national homes of their
respective peoples and recognition of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewis h people.
Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the national homes of their respective
peoples and recognition of the state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people are inherently
symbolic demands, which according to our definition above are not accompanied by tangible
concessions. During the interviews, we examined how important the demands for
recognition are to each of the sides.
While some of the Israeli interviewees supported the demand of mutual recognition,
all had reservations about demanding recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.
Israeli interviewee C, for example, proposed an alternative wording, namely, that both sides
acknowledge the right to mutual self-determination:
The way we did it in the Geneva Accord was much more clever, since in the
Geneva Accord, or even in other places... we said that each of the States can
determine its own identity, or we said Israel defining itself as the home of the
Jewish people, say, signs an agreement with the Palestinian State defining
itself as the national home of the Palestinian people. So that way you don’t
demand that the other side recognize your self-determination, but you demand
that the other side acknowledge that you have the right to self-determination...
Israeli interviewee B believed that it is impossible to reach an agreement without
dealing with the issue of mutual recognition, and offered what he described as a “simple
solution”: “For example, repeat the wording of the UN Partition Plan... and that’s the end of
it... It’s a pragmatic solution to a supposedly symbolic question. ” However, he went on to
say, this solution “is never going to materialize if Israel insists on the ‘symbolic issue’ of
recognizing Israel as the state of the Jewish people, while pragmatically, we don’t need
Palestinians to recognize that: we decide what kind of a country it is. ” He sees this demand
as a part of the above- mentioned process whereby Israeli discourse has shifted from
pragmatic to symbolic issues. Israeli interviewees I and E were exceptions, in that they
disagreed with the notion of mutual recognition as well as with the demand to recognize
Israel as the state of the Jewish people. They asserted that there is no need to demand mutual
recognition. E, for example, stated that a clause addressing mutual recognition should not be
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included in any peace agreement, since such recognition has already been given in the past
and, additionally, no such clause appears in any other peace agreement in the Middle East.
In contrast to the Israelis, Palestinian interviewees were not in agreement regarding
the significance of mutual recognition of national homes, and some opposed this notion.
However, all the Palestinian interviewees concurred with their Israeli counterparts in that
each state may define itself however it sees fit, and claimed that political recognition would
only complicate the issue. For example, Palestinian interviewee M opposed mutual
recognition stating, “because what’s important to the agreement are two things: mutual
political recognition of sovereignty of each state, and then ending the conflict, such that there
will be no demands in the future...” He stated that Israel can define itself in any way it
chooses but the Palestinians should recognize it as it is recognized by international law. On
the other hand, Palestinian interviewee L declared mutual recognition to be “definitely”
important. As for recognizing Israel as the state of the Jewish people, he leaves it to the State
of Israel to decide: “I believe it is up to the Israelis to declare the nature of their state... ”
The Importance of Concrete and Symbolic Demands in Public Opinion
Israeli public opinion.
In the opinion of the Israeli public as of December 2008 and March 2010, the most
important demand was the recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people – in marked
contrast to the Israeli interviewees, who tended to minimize the importance of this demand.
In the December 2008 survey, this symbolic demand was ranked first, and two concrete
demands – securing water rights and setting up early warning facilities – as second and third.
Palestinian recognition of Israeli suffering was ranked as the least important. In March 2010,
the demand for the end of the conflict was ranked second, but it was not clear whether it was
regarded as concrete or symbolic. The demands ranked third and fourth were securing water
rights and setting up early warning facilities, in that order.
In addition to ranking their preferences in the negotiations, the respondents were
asked to choose between Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people
and territorial compromises. The results showed a clear preference for the former over the
latter. In December 2008, 50% of respondents preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as
the state of the Jewish people to sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem
(35%; 6% did not prefer either option, and 10% did not respond or did not know). In the
March 2010 poll, 55% preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish
people, while 25% preferred Israeli sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusa lem;
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11% did not prefer either option, and 10% did not respond or did not know. Of the
respondents who preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people
(N=273), 50% said that they find this much more important than securing so vereignty over
East Jerusalem; 34% said they find it somewhat more important, and 12% said they find it
slightly important (5% did not respond or did not know).
In the December 2008 poll, 46% preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state
of the Jewish people, while 41% preferred sovereignty over settlement blocs in Judea and
Samaria; 5% did not prefer either option, and 9% did not respond or did not know. In March
2010, 38% preferred Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, while
31% preferred Israeli sovereignty over settlement blocs in Judea and Samaria; 11% did not
prefer either option, and 20% did not respond or did not know. Of the respondents who
indicated a preference for Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people
(N=273), 50% said that they see this as much more important than Israeli sovereignty over
the settlements in Judea and Samaria; 35% said it was somewhat more important, and 12%
said it was slightly more important (3% did not respond or did not know).
Thus it appears that, contrary to the belief commonly held among scholars that the
Israeli approach is predominantly concrete, the reality is more complex: Israelis tend to uphold
concrete as well as symbolic demands.
Palestinian public opinion.
Like the Israelis, the Palestinian respondents ranked Israeli recognition of Palestine as
the state of the Palestinian people as their first priority. The second preference was the
concrete issue of safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza, and the third was the
symbolic demand for Israeli recognition of the pain and suffering caused to the Palestinians
throughout the conflict. Last came securing Palestinian water rights in any future agreement.
These findings hold true for both 2008 and 2010.
In a poll conducted in 2003, most Palestinian refugees insisted that any agreement
with Israel must ensure their right to return to their homes and property within Israel. The
majority of the respondents, however, expressed a wish to live within the Palestinian state
(31% in Gaza and the West Bank and 23% in Israeli territories that they envisioned as being
made part the Palestinian state) or in a different host country (17%), rather than in Israel
(10%). This indicates that, at that time, the right of return was seen primarily as a symbolic
right, which most respondents did not intend to realize.
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The December 2008 poll indicates that, at that time, 50% of Palestinian respondents
preferred a state based on the 1967 borders over Israeli recognition of the right of return
accompanied by a return of refugees to Palestine but not to Israel. Only 24% preferred Israeli
recognition of the right of return, even at the cost of a smaller state. Nineteen percent did not
prefer either option, and 4% did not respond or did not know.
In March 2010, 56% of the Palestinian respondents preferred a Palestinian state based
on the 1967 borders over Israeli recognition of the right of return. Twenty-five percent
preferred Israeli recognition and 18% did not respond or did not know. Of the respondents
who preferred a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders (N=716), 52% said that this is
much more important to them than Israeli recognition; 39% said it was somewhat more
important, and 8% said it was slightly more important (0.7% did not respond or did not
know).
We also asked the respondents to choose between Israeli recognition of the right of
return, with a limited number of Palestinians returning to greater Jerusalem, versus
Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. In December 2008, 38%
chose Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem and 33% chose Israeli recognition; 23%
did not prefer either option, and 7% did not respond or did not know. In March 2010, 43%
chose Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem and 35% chose Israeli recognition; 22%
did not respond or did not know. Of the respondents who preferred Palestinian sovereignty
over East Jerusalem (N=543), 50% said that this was much more important to them than
Israeli recognition; 34% said that it was somewhat more important; and 11% said that it was
slightly more important (1% did not respond or did not know).
The Sides’ Perception of Each Other’s Preferences in Te rms of the Symbolic-Concrete
Continuum
The Israeli interviewees’ perceptions of Palestinian attitudes diverged: some saw them
as primarily pragmatic, while others as symbolic. Israeli interviewee A, for example,
described the Palestinians as completely pragmatic:
The Palestinians, I think they care less about dramatic declarations, they want
pragmatic results. What they really want is… give me my freedom… give me
the territory, I want the symbolism less now… Israel unfortunately sets a great
store by such favors and such patronization, like I give you a flag, give you a
national anthem, give you a song and screw you over – excuse me – in simple
Hebrew, when it comes to territory, refugees, Jerusalem and the like...
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Israeli interviewee J felt that, initially, the Palestinians had emphasized more
symbolic matters, but this had changed over the years:
When we started the negotiations with the Palestinians, I was there pretty
much from the very beginning, honor was the most important component for
them and substance was almost meaningless. They also didn’t quite
understand, they didn’t prepare enough, they didn’t know the facts well... no
one cared about the substance... That's not [the case] any more. They have
really changed, they’re organized, know their facts etc. Actually today the one
who cares more about appearances is the Israeli side.
In contrast, Israeli interviewees D, I, B, and H expressed the belief that symbolism is
more important to the Palestinians than concrete demands. Interviewee D described Israel’s
attitude towards territory, water and refugee rights as a fundamentally technical platform, as
opposed to the Palestinians' justice based approach. In his opinion, the conflict between these
two attitudes presented an obstacle in previous negotiations, preventing the sides from eve n
beginning to discuss solutions. Interviewee B also believed that the Palestinians’ attitudes are
mainly symbolic, but he felt that a change had recently occurred in the Israeli approach: today
the Israeli side also concentrates on symbolism, rather than on practicality:
When I started dealing with this issue… 15 years ago… in the beginning, I
thought a major part of the issue was the cultural differences between the two
sides, mainly that we were the pragmatic ones… while they came with an
attitude that cared more about symbols… I’m not so sure this is true [today].
That is, when I look at the importance that is assigned by our side to issues
like the unity of Jerusalem… when I know that anyone who knows anything
about the subject and has examined it knows that the whole thing is pretty
much a bluff.
Israeli interviewees C, E, and G emphasized the importance of an approach that
combines the symbolic and the pragmatic, realizing that symbols are of great importance to
the Palestinians but also that symbolism cannot stand on its own. Interviewee G actually
criticized Israel for being too concrete in its approach, which he dubbed “the thrift-shop
mentality.”
While most of Israeli interviewees had formed an opinion regarding the location of
Palestinian preferences on the concrete-symbolic continuum, the responses of the Palestinians
were much more vague in this respect. For example, Palestinian Interviewee N said that the
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Israelis simply “want to get it all.” In the same vein but in less categorical terms, Interviewee
L stated:
I can’t tell. What we see now are two issues: the issue of security and the
recognition of the state of the Jewish people… The security issue is something
we consider as physical. The recognition in the state of the Jewish people… is
a bit confusing. It just gets in the way...
The position of Palestinian interviewee M was somewhat more complex: he believed
that the Israelis use symbols to justify their political demands.
Discussion
According to a commonly held view, which is also manifested in the academic
literature, one of the main obstacles to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stems from a
disparity between a concrete Israeli orientation and a symbolic Palestinian approach. The
findings here reveal a far more complex reality, with both sides making symbolic and
concrete claims simultaneously. It appears, therefore, that the widespread assumption
regarding the different nature of the demands made by each of the sides is unfounded.
Furthermore, this study shows that this mistaken premise may, in itself, constitute an obstacle
to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. More generally, in light of the finding
obtained in this research, the hypothesis that there is a clear-cut distinction between symbolic
and concrete cultures seems untenable. Crucially, this idea is clearly counterproductive, as
the data suggest that balancing between symbolic and concrete demands in a negotiation can
serve as a tool for achieving conflict resolution.
The Israeli Side
Israeli interviewees were largely in agreement about the degree of importance of
mutual recognition of Israel and Palestine as the national homes of their respective peoples,
and some also supported the political demand that Palestine recognize Israel as the state of
the Jewish people. The literature on political recognition deals for the most part with the
struggle of different groups within a joint social sphere, rather than with conflicts between
states or nations. The interviews conducted for the purpose of this study show that, much as
with individuals and groups, recognition is also sought and demanded by states. Thus, our
research contributes to the scholarly effort in this regard by extending the academic study of
demands for recognition from the national-social to the international context.
On issues of water rights, security and territory, Israeli interviewees appeared to favor
the pragmatic approach. Furthermore, the responses show that all the interviewees who saw
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the demand for the end of the conflict as concrete believed it to be important, while those
who saw it as symbolic were divided as to its importance in the peace process.
In the surveys, Israeli respondents unambiguously placed recognition of Israel as the
state of the Jewish people as their top priority, preferring it over territorial demands. The
second and third preferences, however, were concrete.
The Palestinian Side
The interviews demonstrate that, although the Palestinians interviewees assigned great
importance to symbolic demands, they did not discount concrete interests either. The
recognition of the right of return and of the pain and suffering of refugees was mentioned
over and over again, as well as the demand to accept responsibility. The literature is divided
on the question of whether or not a political apology must involve accepting responsibility
(Auerbach, 2004; Barkan, 2000; Cunningham, 1999; Rotberg, 2006; Rouhana, 2004;
Weyeneth, 2001). In our case, the Palestinians focused on the Israelis’ acknowled gment of
responsibility as a symbolic gesture, which would necessarily entail an apology.
According to the academic literature, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an example of
a case in which the demand for justice has become a key issue. Thus, the goal of the IsraeliPalestinian peace process has frequently been defined as a chieving a “just and stable peace”
(Rouhana, 2004, p. 37), thereby rendering justice as a primary condition to forging peace.
The present study has not supported the above theoretical premise. The concepts of rights
and justice rarely figured in the Palestinian conceptualizations of demands – in fact, these
terms were mentioned only three times, in two interviews. Instead of calling for justice, the
Palestinian interviewees tended to frame specific, concrete demands designed to solve the
problems of security, water, territory and more – although their solutions were less defined or
detailed as compared to those advanced by the Israeli side. And while putting emphasis on
Israeli recognition of the right of return and on the refugees' pain and suffering, as well as on
accepting responsibility for the refugee problem, the Palestinian interviewees clearly
stipulated that these symbolic gestures must be translated into practical measures. Thus, on
the Palestinian side, the discussion of the refugee problem was by no means amorphous or
wrapped in vague terminology such as justice or equity, but appeared to be firmly anchored
in pragmatism and realism.
As for Palestinian public opinion, the rankings given to symbolic and concrete
demands show preference for both. The first priority for most Palestinian respondents was a
symbolic demand: Israeli recognition of Palestine. Their next highest preference, however,
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was concrete: safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza. Recognition of pain and
suffering was clearly more important than water rights, a finding which points to the
importance of the former issue for the Palestinian public. The emphasis Palestinian public
opinion places on concrete aspects was also evident from their preference for a state based on
the 1967 borders or for sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem over
recognition of the right of return.
It is noteworthy that, while both sides weighed symbolic and concrete demands as
equally important, neither side was aware of that tendency on the part of the other. Israeli
interviewees were divided on their perception of the Palestinians' place on the symbolicconcrete continuum, but some of them clearly still saw the Palestinians' attitude as anchored
primarily in symbolic values. As mentioned previously, the prevailing assumption among
scholars is that differences in symbolic versus concrete preferences serve as an obstacle to
conflict resolution. Ironically, the results of this study indicate that it is the assumption itself
that might constitute an obstacle in a quest for peace.
From a different perspective, the Israeli interviewees' awareness of the symbolic
needs of the Palestinians may be helpful in respond ing to the Palestinians’ demands. The
Israeli interviewees acknowledged the importance attached by Palestinians to Israel
recognizing the right of return and the pain and suffering of the refugees, as well as to Israel
accepting responsibility for the refugee problem. As a result of this awareness, the Israeli
interviewees were willing to acquiesce to the former two demands in order to advance the
negotiations. The Palestinian interviewees, on the other hand, had no clear perception of the
Israelis' place on the symbolic-concrete continuum. In so far as symbolic demands carry
great weight in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, this lack of awareness on the part of the
Palestinians may prove an obstacle to constructive negotiation.
As concerns symbolic versus concrete distinction, the present study has shown that
the common assumption regarding a gap between the Israeli and the Palestinian preferences
is unfounded. On the other hand, a disparity emerged between groups within the Israeli
society concerning the value of symbolic aspirations. In the polls, Israeli respondents ranked
the demand for Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people as their top
priority. In contrast, most of the Israeli interviewees believed that this de mand for recognition
is unnecessary, and may even be perceived by the other side as a provocation. Public
opinion is an important player in conflict resolution and, moreover, there is a reciprocal,
inter-dependency relationship between public opinion and leaders. Thus, the disparity found
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between the opinions of the public and the persons interviewed should not be disregarded,
since it constitutes an obstacle that may impede the negotiation and conflict resolution.
Political processes of negotiation, conflict management and conflict resolution require
common ground and shared understanding. One of the central challenges in resolving
international conflicts is the possible failure of talks or accords due to inter- group differences
which hinder communication and prevent sides from agreeing upon shared rules of play
(Wittes, 2005). By the same token, the success of any political dialogue depends on
understanding the goals and the discourse of the 'self' as well as learning about the 'other'
(Gurevich, 2002; Sagi, 1999). Our research demonstrates that, in a conflict, examining the
needs and aspirations of sides through the lens of symbolic and concrete distinction is
essential for promoting mutual understanding and toppling stereotypes.
Thus, awareness of the symbolic and the concrete dimensions in one’s own as well as
the other side’s aspirations is essential for dealing with conflicts. The Joint Israeli-Palestinian
Polls (JIPP) conducted between 2003 and 2006 indicate that an overall package can receive
greater support than its component parts. People’s rationale is largely based on trade-offs, so
one component may be seen as a compensation for another (Shamir & Shikaki, 2010). This
research has shown that the relationship between symbolic and concrete demands can serve
as a tool for achieving a compensatory balance. Israeli interviewees proposed varied ideas
for symbolic acts as a compensation for concrete concessions. The findings suggest,
therefore, that understanding which core issues are seen mostly as concrete (for example
land, in our case) and which as symbolic (for example, recognition) improves the chances
that the sides will agree upon the overall package in a negotiation. Put differently, in
international conflict management and conflict negotiation, it is essential to understand and
analyze the sides’ attitudes towards symbolic demands, as this may facilitate conflict
resolution as well as reconciliation.
As we maintained earlier, a demand can be seen as both symbolic and concrete. The
right of return issue, for example, has two dimensions: a concrete demand for physical return
and a symbolic demand for recognition of the right to return. We have found that a trade-off
between the two dimensions can be used to achieve conflict resolution. In the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, both sides agree that the right of return cannot possibly be realized by
having all refugees return to Israeli territory within the Green Line. This is evident from the
results of the December 2011 JIPP poll: 45% among Palestinians support a solution based on
permanent residency of the refugees in Palestinian and the Israeli areas transferred to
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Palestinian (residency in host countries, third countries, or Israel would be subject to the
decision of these states). While the refugee problem is generally seen as an intractable issue,
in our study the interviewees on both sides asserted that recognizing the right of return can be
exchanged for Palestinians waiving the actual return and thereby conceding that this right
would ultimately remain unrealized. This result suggests that openness to symbolic demands
and the trade-off between the symbolic and the concrete dimensions within the same demand
may serve as a means to promote conflict resolution. Further studies may examine how this
strategy can be applied to other international conflicts, based on an understanding of the
importance of symbolic demands for recognition in conflicts.
The above discussion does not imply that symbolic-concrete compensation is possible
for all demands in a conflict. The Palestinian interviewees were reluctant to agree to mutual
recognition of Israel and Palestine as the national homes of their respective people, despite
the importance attached to these demands by the Israeli side. Furthermore, they spoke
against recognizing Israel as the state of the Jewish people, in spite of this issue’s importance
for the Israeli public opinion. And while the Palestinian side set a great store by the Israeli
acceptance of responsibility for the refugee problem, the Israeli interviewees were divided on
whether this demand should be met. It seems, therefore, that the study of conflict resolution
can benefit from a better understanding of the ways in which recognition can serve as an
obstacle to resolving conflicts, on the one hand, and as a tool to aid it, on the other.
An assumption underlying the few studies dealing with the symbolic-concrete
distinction regarding conflict resolution is that cultures can be classified into two clear-cut
categories: symbolic versus concrete (Abu-Nimar, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Inbar & YuchtmanYaar, 1985). Yet, as we have seen in the Israeli case, within the same culture, public opinion
and leadership can attach different importance to symbolic demands. Thus, further research
on symbolic aspects in conflict resolution would do well to cast such inter-culture
assumptions aside. The perception of a culture in academia must take into account its
complex nature, and seemingly irrational phenomena should be examined based on the
analysis of the symbolic discourse in various public arenas where conflicts are presented and
framed.
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